"DoubleSpeak and The War On Terrorism" by Timothy Lynch (CATO Institute Briefing Paper)

http://www.cato.org/pubs/bp/bp98.pdf (Click)

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LeftAngst

"We are in a strange period of history in which a revolutionary has to be a patriot and a patriot has to be a revolutionary." - George Orwell

Justices Won't Intervene In Terror case

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The federal prosecution of seven Iranian-Americans accused of supporting an alleged terrorist group will go forward after the U.S. Supreme Court refused to intervene.

The justices turned down an appeal Monday from the political exiles -- all now U.S. citizens -- who backed an Iranian opposition group that the State Department designated as a "terrorist organization" a decade ago.

At issue was the power of the government to try those accused of giving money to groups linked to terrorism, without giving the defendants a chance to show that the organization was improperly designated.

The seven were charged in March 2001 with providing "material support" to the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, also known by the initials MEK. In particular, the government accuses the seven Iranian-Americans of trying to solicit money at Los Angeles International Airport.

The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran seeks a secular democratic government in Iran and the ouster of the current cleric rule. It has been accused of a long-standing campaign of bombings and assassinations, among other activities.

In its high court appeal, attorneys for the dissidents said the group "publishes periodicals, has lobbied Congress, and has aided the United States' investigation into terrorist bombings and into Iran's nuclear program." The organization describes itself as a "political" group.

Five years ago, about 150 members of Congress asked the Bush administration to remove the "terrorist organization" label from the group.

The appeal claimed the group was labeled a "terrorist organization" by the United States in 1997 as a "goodwill gesture" to then-newly elected President Mohammed Khatami.

Airline passenger rights

In another national security-related case, the high court also declined to get involved in a dispute over airline passenger rights and privacy.

John Gilmore, a U.S. citizen living in northern California, wanted to travel to Washington in July 2002 but was not allowed to board his flight.

The reason: He refused to produce any personal identification at Oakland International Airport. He was told officials could refuse him passage because of a "secret" government directive that he claims he was not allowed to see.

At issue was whether the government may keep secret a "policy statement" that is generally applicable to millions of passengers every day, a directive the government fully acknowledges exists.

The Bush administration says the rule is necessary for national security but has not identified any regulation justifying it, nor any "special circumstances" -- such as an imminent threat of a terrorist attack by air -- to justify its continued secrecy.

On his Web site, Gilmore -- who describes himself as an "entrepreneur and civil libertarian" -- said he sued the Transportation Security Administration "to make them stop demanding that citizens identify themselves in order to travel."

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LeftAngst

DOJ IG VINDICATES CREW'S CONDUCT IN FOLEY MATTER

Control + Click: http://www.citizensforethics.org/press/newsrelease.php?view=196

For Immediate Release: January 22, 2007

Contact: Naomi Seligman Steiner - 202.408.5565 / press@citizensforethics.org

DOJ IG VINDICATES CREW’S CONDUCT IN FOLEY MATTER

IG FINDS FBI PROVIDED PUBLIC WITH “INACCURATE” INFORMATION

Washington, DC - Earlier today, the Department of Justice Inspector General (IG) released its report regarding the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) response to former Rep. Mark Foley’s (R-FL) emails to a former House page.

In July 2006, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) sent the emails to the FBI for investigation. In October, after the FBI revealed that it had not conducted any investigation into the emails, CREW requested an IG inquiry into the FBI’s inaction. Days later, CREW sent a second letter to the IG asking for a review of FBI misstatements regarding CREW’s conduct in the matter.

In its report, the IG concludes that the FBI should have taken some action when CREW sent the Foley emails to the Bureau in July and it should have “notified CREW, the complainant in this case, that the FBI declined to open an investigation.” The IG based this assessment, in part, on the fact that the language in Rep. Foley’s emails “fell within the type of behavior that the FBI warns against in its Parent’s Guide to Internet Safety.”

Regarding the misstatements to the media regarding the information CREW provided to the FBI, the IG found that “statements attributed to the FBI and the Department about CREW and the Foley e-mails were not accurate.” First, the IG found that contrary to the FBI’s claims, the emails CREW forwarded were not redacted by CREW and that the “emails still contained the full names of the pages and the House employee to whom the emails were sent.” Further, the IG found that despite statements to the contrary, the FBI “did not seek additional information from CREW,” other than one follow-up phone call. Finally, the IG found that the emails were provided to CREW in July 2006, not April as an unnamed FBI source had claimed.

The report concludes that “the information provided by the FBI and the Department inaccurately portrayed the information that CREW provided to the FBI, and inaccurately suggested that CREW’s actions were the cause of the FBI’s decision not to investigate the emails.”

In response to the report, CREW’s executive director Melanie Sloan said, “By forwarding the emails to the FBI for investigation, CREW stands out as the only party in this sordid affair to have done the right thing from the first instance.” Sloan continued, “In marked contrast, not only did the FBI fail to investigate the possible sexual abuse of minors by a sitting member of Congress, the Bureau then tried to cover up its shocking inaction by blaming CREW. The IG’s report vindicates CREW completely.”

Finally, Sloan stated that she hoped the FBI would learn from this incident and, in the future, be quicker to investigate potential crimes against children.

***

Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) is a non-profit legal watchdog group dedicated to holding public officials accountable for their actions.

For more information, please visit www.citizensforethics.org or contact Naomi Seligman Steiner at 202.408.5565/nseligman@citizensforethics.org.

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LeftAngst

Art Imitating The Life Of Our UN-democratic State...

“This is how liberty dies…with thunderous applause.” —Padmé Amidala (Star Wars Episode III: Revenge of the Sith)


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LeftAngst

W Pulls Bait-n-Switch On FISC Review of NSA's Terrorist Surveillance Program

The acknowledgement that the FISA Court ("FISC") (created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) will now offer a pre-review of any federal govt actions towards secret domestic spying relative to, and connected with, the NSA's “Terrorist Surveillance Program” (TSP) rings awkwardly hollow. However, from intense research and policy review, we know that the federal govt has acknowledged-and-confirmed the presence of 199 (approx) (many more go unconfirmed as an “executive privilege” or “as a matter of natl security”) anti-terrorism data mining surveillance programs that monitor and track the communications of individuals (citizens and non-citizens without differentiation) through telephonic or other electronic means that are similarly governed by FISA and must be approved by the FISC.

Please note the specificity with which the Administration (particularly AG Gonzales) notes that electronic and domestic wiretap surveillance for the TSP is subject to FISC review-and-approval. However, the FISA does not restrict itself to one particular fed govt program. It has govt-wide applicability, and the FISC must review-and-approve ANY AND ALL electronic and domestic wiretap surveillance of citizens for it to be legal and constitutional. That has not (will not) occur. These are a few electronic and domestic wiretap programs that are currently being administered as a part of the perpetually infinite, so-called War on Terror:

 NSLs (National Security Letters): These empower the fed govt to obtain 3rd party records (email, telephonic, recorded, et al) from businesses relative to citizens. More than 30,000 are issued per year.

 “Imperative Security Internee” Status Designations: While not a surveillance program, this status designation has been secretly used by W's cohorts of neo-con leadership to replace “Enemy Combatant.” As SCOTUS ruled in the Hamdan case, so-called and arbitrarily designated “enemy combatants” that are citizens retain certain rights, esp those associated with the FISC review-and-approval of warrantless spying, wiretaps, etc in which they are the subjects. In response, the adm changed the rules by coming up with a new–– and equally AMBIGUOUS, CRITIERIA-LESS, ILLEGAL, and UNCONSTITUTIONAL term (“imperative security internee”) ––to achieve the same function (stripping the citizen of the FISC review-and-approval rights) that has yet to be challenged in a fed court environment because most are unaware of its categorical existence.


 Counter-Intelligence Field Activity (CIFA) Report Tracking: This classified (budget and existence are classified) DoD agency manages the JPEN database. The JPEN database is a cumulative tracking and observation reporting of inter-DoD agency surveillance programs (electronic, telephonic, physical assets, etc). The JPEN database info does not have to be vetted-for-validity in order to be the basis for citizen and non-citizen surveillance. CIFA tracking also represents non-compliance with the Privacy Act (’74) and the SCOTUS decision in Griswold v Connecticut (’65).

 USAF Office of Special Investigator’s SIPRNET Program: This is the "super-duper" secret internet system of the DoD (military). No public access. The transmission of classified information includes, but is not limited to, citizen-specific raw, unvetted surveillance data. This is not review-able by FISC and does not comply with FISA, but can (does) carry parallel information.

 U.S. Customs’ Automated Targeting System: This program captures raw data and information on all people (citizens, non-citizens, green card residents, inddividuals with VISAs, etc) that move in-and-out (across) USA borders. The criteria for assignment of “risk” is secret, and, therefore, "unchallenge-able." This system is overly intrusive, unspecified, and prohibited by the Privacy Act (’74) and FISA.

 USAF Eagle Eyes Program: This program of “ambiguous, suspicious activity” reports id forwarded by USAF members or community residents near USAF bases. This is a USAF Office of Special Investigations Program. The Eagle Eyes raw data gets swooped (sorry about the cliché/pun) into the larger TALON meta-database. This is not review-able by FISC and does not comply with FISA.

 DoD’s TALON (Threat And Local Observation Notice) Program: This is the “suspicious-activity-and-incidents” report that the CIFA reporting tracking system utilizes to collect surveilled citizens and non-citizens alike. This program is composed of unconfirmed information regarding whether citizens are alleged (credible) “threats” to USA. This – again and erroneously! – is a DoD program that is not subjected to FISA or FISC review-and-approval as constitutionally-required.

 Treasury Department’s SWIFT Program: This intl financial program established under Belgian law (made up of a multitude of cross-natl institutions, some obviously based in USA). USA used its Terrorist Finance Tracking Program to link to SWIFT electronically, and monitor (surveille) cash, cash mgt, and other financial transactions believed to be associated with terrorist actions of citizens and non-citizens. This is not review-able by FISC and does not comply with FISA (note that the Europeans [Belgian Govt] even believe that it breaches their sovereign privacy laws).

 Homeland Security (DHS)’s Protect America’s Homeland Defense Info-Sharing System: This is a horizontal (fed-to-fed) and vertical (fed-to-local) threat analysis program and info-sharing database that was a part of W’s budget request following Sept 11th. No details…classified…no verification of procedures or technology components exists. Hearsay information that does not reach any law enforcement or judiciary standards are relied upon, and provide the database profiles for citizens and non-citizens alike. This is not review-able by FISC and does not comply with FISA.

The media has fallen asleep behind the wheel of democracy, and let pro-corporatist neo-cons drive under the influence of power. Let's take America back...from the grassroots-up!

Progressively,
LeftAngst